ABSTRACT This paper analyses the optimal pricing strategies of two sales models for a service product: the use-based mode, in which a customer pays for each use, and the prepaid-based mode, in which a customer enjoys a service with a card that represents an up-front payment for a period of time. For the prepaid mode, we analyze a kind of unlimited card, such as a fitness card. With considerations of customers' perceived value, transfer fees and the time-value of the funds, we establish generalized pricing models of a service product under these two sales modes in a monopoly, and discuss the pricing strategies between two companies using game theory in a duopoly. Research shows that in a monopoly, the optimal use-based price is identical whether the transfer fee exists or not, and the optimal prepaid-based price when the transfer fee exists is lower than when it does not exist. In a duopoly, according to game theory, we can derive two Nash equilibria from nine situations. Finally, through numerical examples, we verify the effectiveness of the pricing strategy and derive some managerial insights.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, with the development of commerce, sales models have become increasingly diversified. A new sales model named the prepaid-based mode has been emerging in service industries. The prepaid-based mode is when a consumer covers all the payments for services before he/she enjoys the service and obtains a paper or electronic identification CARD with identity and balance records as a credential [1] . Prepaid cards have been issued in association with particular companies, and they can be used only when purchasing goods or service products from that particular company [2] .
The prepaid-based mode is actually a contract signed between a company and a customer that is long-term and continuous. Some customers may transfer their prepaid cards to others for certain special reasons during the contract period. Hence, prepaid cards for service products can be divided into two categories, the prepaid card with a transfer fee or one without a transfer fee, and the transfer fee is an important factor that this study has to consider. To date, most studies have analysed the problems of prepaid cards from the perspective of legislation and consumer rights. Therefore, it is necessary to refine and research the pricing strategy of the service product under both the use-based and prepaid-based modes, which is a useful supplement to the research on service pricing under existing prepaid modes.
In this paper, we analyse the optimal pricing strategies of two sales models for a service product: the use-based mode, in which a customer pays for each use, and the prepaid-based mode, in which a customer enjoys a service with a card that represents an up-front payment for a period of time. Firstly, we establish a generalized pricing model for a service product under the use-based and prepaid-based modes in a monopoly, and obtain the optimal pricing strategy in a monopoly. Subsequently, after analysing pricing strategies of these two modes in duopoly market by the game theory, we find out the pure strategies and mixed strategies, respectively. Finally, numerical examples on pricing fitness service, who provides a kind of unlimited prepaid card, in different market environments are conducted.
Compared with the existing studies, such as Balasubramanian et al. (2015) [3] , the major contributions of this paper are discussed as follows. (1) This work makes up for the lack of the existing studies that pricing prepaid card of a service product. Tertiary industries (i.e., the service industry) have become increasingly more important in economic growth, and the prepaid-based mode that represents the pricing innovation plays a vital role in promoting this industrial development. Therefore, our study is of practical significance for the service industry company to set prices and make decisions properly; (2) The customer's perceived value and perceived risk (i.e., the psychological cost) are introduced in our model, which can scientifically measure the perceived utility of the service to customers and describe the effect of customers' psychology on purchase behaviours; (3) The transfer fee of a prepaid card is considered in our model; (4) The time-value of funds is included. The main profit of prepaid card mode is derived from the interest generated by the pre-accepted funds. The prepaid card mode is a good method to alleviate the cash flow constraint for a capital constrained company. We believe that our new model and analyses will help service providers better price their services and guide companies to design desirable regulations for prepaid cards.
The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 gives the assumptions and the basic model. Section 4 derives the optimal pricing strategy in a monopoly. In Section 5, through game theoretical analysis, we analyse the competitive setting and propose the pure pricing strategies and mixed pricing strategies. Section 6 presents numerical examples and obtains managerial insights. Finally, Section 7 provides the conclusions and future research directions.
II. RELATED WORK
This work is related to two streams of literature. The first stream of literature studies the pricing strategies of a service product under the use-based and/or prepaid-based modes. The second stream focuses on psychological factors influencing customer buying behaviours and decisions. We discuss them separately below.
A. THE PRICING STRATEGIES FOR A SERVICE PRODUCT
Related studies regarding the pricing problem of a service product under the use-based (i.e., traditional) and/or prepaid-based modes are as follows. From the perspective of customer value, Desiraju and Shugan (1999) [4] investigated pricing strategies based on yield management systems (YMS) such as early discounting, overbooking, and limiting early sales for capacity-constrained services. Xie and Shugan (2001) [5] conducted a series of careful studies on the advanced selling of services and determined when and how to advance sales in a variety of situations to improve profits. Altmann and Chu (2001) [6] discussed a pricing method that combines the advantage of flat-rate pricing and use-based pricing through an empirical results of the Internet Demand Experiment (INDEX) project but did not conduct a mathematical analysis. Soman (2001) [7] conducted two experiments to prove that the use of different payment mechanisms influences the accurate recall of past payments and the experiencing of the full negative impact. Hence, it moderates the effects of past payments on future spending. Considering situations in which product demand is price-dependent and customers with reservations may cancel advance orders, You (2005) [8] incorporated the reservation selling system and the cancellation phenomena into his model and determined the ordering quantity and prices for service products. Rust and Chung (2006) [9] established models of service and relationships in dynamic markets and suggested the increasing importance of analysing customer lifetime value (CLV) and managing the firm's customer equity.
With the development of science and technology, scholars gradually focused on pricing Internet-related service products, such as pricing information products and pricing network services. Liang et al. (2018) [10] studied a variety of data pricing models, such as free data strategy, usage-based pricing strategy, package pricing strategy, flat pricing strategy, etc., but they did not give mathematical analysis. Ma (2016) [11] considered generic congestion-prone network services and study usage-based pricing of service providers under market competition. Zhang et al. (2014) [12] found that the usage-based scheme usually achieves a higher consumer surplus and more efficient traffic utilization than the flat-rate scheme. Sundararajan (2004) [13] derived that the combination of a fixed-fee and use-based pricing always increases profits and they further showed that offering fixed-fee pricing in addition to a non-linear use-based pricing scheme always improves profits. Mo et al. (2013) [14] studied the pricing of Internet services under monopolistic and duopolistic environments using an analytic model in which a service provider and users try to maximize their respective pay-offs. Balasubramanian et al. (2015) [3] analysed the sales pricing mechanism and pay-per-use pricing mechanism for information goods under monopolistic and duopolistic markets, respectively. Safari et al. (2015) [15] developed a continuous time optimal control model for identifying pricing strategies for the web service classes with consideration of the purchase intentions of customers under different service qualities and proposed an algorithm for optimal pricing. Related articles can be found in Liang et al. (2013) [16] , Ma (2016) [11] and Bhargava and Gnagwar (2016) [17] .
In contrast, our paper considers the transfer fee of prepaid cards for a service product and the time-value of the cash in prepaid cards. To the best of our knowledge, no papers provide a mathematical analysis of the pricing strategies for prepaid cards with the transfer fee and the cash's time-value.
B. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
Other than company's own factors, such as costs, psychological factors influencing customer buying behaviours and decisions cannot be ignored. Scholars generally believed that the perceived value and the perceived risk are the bases of consumers' purchase decisions.
For the perceived value, Wood and Scheer (1996) [18] added the perceived risk to the model of perceived value proposed by Dodds and Monroe (1985) [19] and established a basic model of consumption decisions based on perceived value. They argued that perceived value is the result of the trade-off between the perceived benefits and the possible costs for the benefit, and the greater that the perceived value is, the greater that the customer's willingness of purchase is.
For the perceived risk, Conchar et al. (2004) [20] formulated an integrated framework for the conceptualization of perceived-risk processing. Beneke et al. (2013) [21] , through empirical research on the sales of own-brand merchandise, stated that the perceived risk and perceived value play key roles in the decision-making process of consumption, and improving product quality and after-sales service are important ways to reduce the perceived risk and improve perceived value. Furthermore, it was introduced by Train et al. (1987) [22] that psychological costs, i.e., the perceived risk, will reduce the enthusiasm of customers, and this captures the ticking meter effect that results when payment is tightly linked to consumption.
In contrast, this paper introduces the perceived value and the perceived risk in our models, simultaneously, which is not studied in the literature. Furthermore, none of the previous papers have explicitly come up with that the perceived risk refers to disutility of the use-based mode compared to prepaid consumption (such as the inconvenience of payments, different statuses and mental expenses) when the use-based mode and prepaid-based mode coexist.
III. ASSUMPTIONS AND THE BASIC MODEL A. ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made to build the mathematical pricing model.
Assumption 1:
The market capacity is constant, and there are N customers in the market [3] .
Assumption 2: The customer purchases the service each time by one of the following ways: pay cash immediately or use a prepaid card. The prepaid card is a kind of registered card that is paid for up-front and has unrestricted use during contract period T .
Assumption 3: All customers have the same perceived utility φ and psychological costs c per use of service. This psychological cost reflects the ticking meter effect that results when the payment is closely tied to consumption, and is consistent with Train (1991) [23] , Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) [24] , etc. Furthermore, a similar cost has frequently been associated with use-based payment, such as Balasubramanian et al. (2015) [3] . The customers' perceived risk of the prepaid-based mode is R i = αp 2 (0 ≤ α < 1, p 2 > p 1 > 0), where the symbol α represents the uncertainty about the outcome of decisions and the prepaid card price p 2 represents the seriousness of consequences. This uncertainty is closely related to the credibility and reputation of the companies themselves. Compared with the prepaid-based consumption decision, the uncertainty of the use-based consumption decision is 0.
Assumption 4: The loss and discard of the prepaid card are not taken into consideration. Nonetheless, we assume that β portion of customers will transfer their prepaid cards to others successfully in every contract period T .
Assumption 5:
The customer i uses the service k i times on average in each contract period T . k i obeys a uniform probability distribution in the range (0, k H ), and its expectation is E (k i ) = k H /2, where k H denotes the upper limit of the distribution.
Assumption 6: Considering time-value of funds, the company should invest immediately after receiving the advance payment. Suppose the annual return on investment for businesses is I .
B. THE BASIC MODEL
The customer who wants to buy service products often faces two choices. One is use-based consumption, which means paying cash once for each use of service. The other is prepaid-based consumption with a card, which means paying the service fee to the company in advance and enjoying unlimited use of the service within a contract period T . The customer's payment choices are based on their perceived benefits, perceived risks and psychological costs. We assume that customers are rational in that they will choose the consumption mode that makes their residual value the largest. The total surplus obtained by customer i in every contract period T under the use-based consumption mode is:
where p 1 denotes the price of each service under use-based consumption mode. The total surplus obtained by customer i in every contract period T under the prepaid-based consumption mode is:
where p 2 denotes the price of the prepaid card under this consumption mode in contract period T , and α represents the uncertainty about the outcomes of decisions. Customer i will find the use-based consumption feasible only when k i (φ − p 1 − c) ≥ 0, i.e., φ − c ≥ p 1 , which is the participation constraint. The customer who usually uses the service prefers the prepaid card. Hence, we can infer that there is a threshold of k i . Only when U 1i ≤ U 2i , i.e.,
will the customer choose the prepaid-based mode. In a monopolistic market where both consumption modes coexist, the percentage of customers who choose use-based consumption is
and the percentage of customers who choose the prepaidbased mode is
Then, the market shares of the use-based mode and the prepaid-based mode are MS 1 , MS 2 , respectively, where and
].
According to Assumption 5, the average frequency of using the service during the contract period T for customer i who chooses use-based consumption is subject to a uniform probability distribution in the range [0,
, and the expected times of this category of customers are
IV. PRICING STRATEGY IN MONOPOLY MARKET
We first give the results for the service company in a monopoly with a transfer fee. 
Proof: See Parts 1 to 3 of Appendix A for the detailed solution process.
Proposition 1: The combination of them is higher than using only one of them alone.
Proof: See Part 4 of Appendix A. Special Case: If the prepaid card is not allowed to transfer (β = 0), or the transfer fee is not required (p = 0) (i.e., βp = 0), we can get the following results, as Table 2 shows. From Table 1 < 0. In a conclusion, we can find that the optimal price of a service product under the use-based pricing mode is identical whether the transfer fee exists or not, and the optimal prepaid-based price when the transfer fee exists is lower than when it does not exist.
V. PRICING STRATEGY IN DUOPOLY MARKET
In this section, we discuss the setting of the duopolistic market. This paper assumes that there are two companies (Company A and Company B), and the companies offer an undifferentiated service. In other words, the service provided by the two companies can be replaced each other, and the competition of the companies will be mainly reflected in the pricing. With the consideration of the transfer fee, we first analyse the pure strategies wherein each company can use either or both pricing strategies and then give the special case of no transfer fee. Second, we give a symmetric, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, which represents the probability of choosing the use-based mode and the prepaid-based mode for the two companies.
A. PURE STRATEGIES
No matter whether the transfer fee exists or not, the nonzero Nash equilibrium results under the pure strategies for service providers are as shown in Table 3 . There are nine outcomes. We divide these nine results into three categories and correspondingly form the following three propositions. 
2(I +1) T ), and the expected profits of the two companies are
(
, and the expected profits of the two compa-
B. MIXED STRATEGIES
From the previous sub-section, we derive that there are two asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria when the two companies offer identical service products with one company adopting the use-based strategy and the other using the prepaid-based strategy. In practice, however, the strategy that their rival would adopt is uncertain for both of them. Hence, each company can also adopt a mixed-strategy in a Nash equilibrium. Because Company A and Company B have the same pricing mode but only different strategies, the two companies will have the same expected profits when both of them choose the use-based mode or the prepaid-based mode. We denote 1 as the expected profits of the company with the use-based pricing strategy, 2 as the expected profits of the company using the prepaid-based pricing strategy, A1 as the expected profits that Company A obtains from the use-based mode, A2 as the expected profits that Company A obtains from the prepaid-based mode, B1 as the expected profits that Company B obtains from the use-based mode, and B2 as the expected profits that Company B obtains from the prepaid-based mode. Then, A1 = B1 = 1 and A2 = B2 = 2 . The pay-off matrix if one company adopts the use-based strategy and the competitor uses the prepaid-based strategy is shown in Table 4 .
In this game, if the Nash equilibrium exists, no matter under what pricing strategy is chosen by one company, the other company will find a pure-strategy that makes his/her expected total profits remain equal over the different choices. Denote the probability that Company A chooses the use-based pricing strategy as θ 1 , and the probability that Company B chooses the prepaid-based pricing strategy as θ 2 . Then, the expected profit of Company B under two strategies is equal, i.e.,
and the expected profit of Company A under both strategies is also equal, i.e.,
From (17) and (18), we can obtain the following equations :
It is easy to find that θ 1 + θ 2 = 1. Hence, there is a unique, symmetric, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which each the company chooses the use-based pricing strategy with a probability of 
where
Proof: Omitted. Special Case: For the case that the prepaid card is not allowed to transfer or the transfer fee is zero, by substituting (13-16) for (18),(19a) and (19b) , we can obtain:
From above results, we can derive that the mixed-strategy equilibrium will yield non-zero profits when both companies have a probability of 2θ 1 (1 − θ 1 ) . Actually, the probability is higher if they engage in one-way rather than two-way communications [25] . They can also coordinate their strategies when there is a fixed cost of entry that is private information [26] .
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
To verify the effectiveness of the pricing strategy, we take the pricing of a fitness service as an example. The prepaid card of this example is an annual card (i.e., T = 1year), and it can be transferred with a transfer fee p = $1500. The assignment of parameters is in Table 5 . Since the customer's psychological cost c needs to be investigated deeply by the customer (there is a great deal of uncertainty), the following mainly discusses the impacts of psychological cost c on the pricing of fitness service product and its prepaid card, and the expected profits of the company.
A. PRICING STRATEGY OF FITNESS SERVICE IN MONOPOLY MARKET
In a monopolistic market, companies have three pricing strategies for fitness service products: the use-based pricing strategy, the prepaid-based pricing strategy and the coexistence of the two pricing strategies. This sub-section just takes the combination of the use-based and prepaid-based pricing strategies as an example for analysis. This is done because the price of the service product is constant in the setting of the use-based pricing alone and because the price of the prepaid card is not affected by the customer's psychological cost in the situation of only the prepaid-based pricing. When two kinds of pricing strategies coexist, the pricing of the fitness service product under the use-based pricing mode with different customers' psychological costs is shown in Figure 1 . And Figure 2 shows the pricing of the fitness service product under the prepaid-based pricing mode with different customer VOLUME 6, 2018 psychological costs in the case of ''With Transfer fee'' and ''Without Transfer fee''.
From Figure 1 , we can find that the relationship between the price of the fitness service under use-based pricing and the customer psychological cost is linear. As the customer psychological cost increases, the price of the service declines gradually. As shown in Figure 2 , whether the transfer fee exists or not, the relationship between the price of the fitness service under prepaid-based pricing and the customer psychological cost is non-linear, and the price decreases as the customer psychological cost increases, but the decreasing rate is gradually slow. In addition, the optimal prepaid-based price when the transfer fee exists is lower than when it does not exist. The expected profits of the fitness service product under different pricing strategies are all related to the customer psychological cost, as shown in Figure 3 .
From Figure 3 , we can derive that if there is only the use-based pricing mode, the expected profits of the company are negatively correlated with the customers' psychological costs. If only the prepaid-based pricing mode exists, the company's expected profits are not affected by customers' psychological costs. If the two pricing strategies coexist, the expected profits decrease as the customer psychological costs increase, but the rate of decrease gradually reduces.
In addition, it can be seen from Figure 3 Therefore, we can derive the following management insights: In a monopoly, when the psychological costs of customers are low, the pricing strategy that the company chooses is the combination of the two kinds of consumption modes that yields the highest expected profits, followed by the use-based pricing strategy. When the customer psychological cost is high, the pricing strategy that the company chooses is the combination of two kinds of consumption modes that still yields the highest expected profits, followed by the prepaid-based pricing strategy. In short, no matter what the customer's psychological costs is, selecting the strategy of both use-based pricing and prepaid-based pricing is always advisable.
B. PRICING STRATEGY OF FITNESS SERVICE IN DUOPOLY MARKET
It is assumed here that in the duopolistic market, Company A and Company B provide the same fitness service product. The following is a detailed analysis of the Nash equilibria of the fitness service product's pricing strategies.
When one company adopts the pricing strategy under the used-based pricing strategy and the other adopts the prepaid-based pricing strategy, there are two Nash equilibria with pure strategies. Suppose that Company A chooses the use-based pricing strategy and Company B chooses the prepaid-based pricing strategy. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the optimal price of the fitness service in a duopoly at different customer psychological costs under the use-based pricing mode and the prepaid-based pricing mode, respectively. From Figure 4 , it is not hard to see that p * A1 and customers' psychological costs are positively correlated at c < 50, while they are negatively correlated at c > 50. From Figure 5 , we have that p * B2 and the customer psychological cost are positively correlated with c < 50, but p * B2 remains unchanged if c > 50. Figure 6 shows the changes of the expected profits of the two companies at Nash equilibrium points with different customer psychological costs.
From Figure 6 , we can see that if c < 50, the expected profits of Company A and Company B decrease rapidly with the increase of the customer psychological costs at the beginning, and then increase as the customer psychological cost increases. If c > 50, the expected profits of Company A that adopts the use-based pricing mode decrease as the customer psychological cost increases, but the expected profits of Company B that adopts the prepaid-based pricing mode are unaffected by the customer psychological cost (i.e., they remain unchanged). No matter how customer psychological cost c changes, the expected profits of Company B are always significantly higher than those of Company A. Obviously, the Nash equilibrium for a company's pricing strategy can exist under the condition of the pure strategy, but the expected profits of the two companies vary greatly. Each company wants to choose a strategy that yields higher expected profits. However, choosing a strategy with larger expected profits will result in zero-profits for the company with a slightly higher price. Then, Company A and Company B will adopt a mixed strategy in a Nash equilibrium, in which the probability θ 2 of the prepaid-based pricing strategy makes the other company indifferent between the use-based and prepaid-based pricing modes. Figure 7 shows the Nash equilibrium results of the mixed strategy game between Company A and Company B for the pricing strategy.
It can be seen from Figure 7 that both Company A and Company B have a greater probability of choosing a prepaid-based pricing strategy, and expected profit margins of the two consumer pricing strategies differ greatly.
Therefore, we can derive the management insight that the two companies can negotiate before the game and relevant dividends can be allocated for the subsequent profit distribution to avoid a vicious competition that may result in zero profits. In short, only cooperation can achieve a win-win situation.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper establishes generalized pricing models for service products under the use-based and prepaid-based modes in a monopoly and a duopoly, respectively. With considerations of customers' perceived value, transfer fees and the time-value of the funds, we establish a generalized pricing model for service products and the prepaid card that allows for unlimited use in the contract period in a monopoly, and discuss VOLUME 6, 2018 the pricing strategies between two companies in a duopoly using game theory. The research shows that in a monopoly, the combination of the two sales models is the optimal choice for the companies. In a duopoly, companies can negotiate with each other cheaply to coordinate the strategies in order to avoid the vicious competition that may result in zero profits. The significance of this paper is that it provides a systematic and scientific pricing decision basis for the prepaid-based mode that is prevailing in the service industry today. This will help the industry develop efficiently and steadily in the fierce market competition for a long time. Scientifically measuring the perceived utility of service and the possibility of loss of customer decision-making is still an area for improvement in this paper. Visualizing the concept of abstraction using scientific methods will make the model more complete and make the research more convincing. Furthermore, using some real data to assign the parameters in the model can make it have certain reference value for pricing a certain kind of service, which makes the research have more practical value.
APPENDIX A A. ONLY USE-BASED MODE
If the service company offers the use-based consumption mode only, the total market share is MS 1 = N . The customer i will adopt the service product only if
According to Assumption 5, if MS 1 = N , the expectation of the use frequency is E (k i ) = k H /2. Therefore, the mathematical programming problem that the company must solve is:
where 1 (p 1 ) denotes the expected profits of the company under the situation of offering the use-based consumption mode only. By taking the first-order derivatives of 1 (p 1 ) with respect to p 1 , we obtain
Hence, 1 (p 1 ) is a monotonically decreasing function with regard to p 1 , and the company's optimal price per use is
Then, the optimal expected profits for the company are *
B. ONLY PREPAID-BASED MODE
If the service company offers the prepaid-based consumption mode only, the customer i will adopt the service product only if
. In other words, if the average service-using frequency during each contract period k i within the range
, k H , then customer i will purchase the prepaid card and participate in the service. According to Assumption 5, the mathematical programming problem of this case is:
where 2 (p 2 ) denotes the expected profits of the company under the situation of offering the prepaid-based consumption mode only. By taking the first-order derivatives of 2 (p 1 ) with respect to p 2 , we obtain
By taking the second-order derivatives of 2 (p 1 ) with respect to p 2 , we obtain
Therefore, 2 (p 2 ) is a concave function in p 2 ; hence, there exists a unique maximum solution. By setting the Eq. (A6) to zero (i.e., d 2 dp 2 = 0) and re-arranging the terms, we obtain the company's optimal price for the prepaid card per period:
The optimal expected profits for the company are
In particular, if the prepaid card is not allowed to be transferred (β = 0), or if the transfer fee is not required (p = 0) (i.e., βp = 0), we can obtain
And
C. SOLUTION FOR BOTH USE-BASED AND PREPAID-BASED MODE
In this situation, the company uses both the use-based consumption and the prepaid-based consumption modes. The mathematical programming is
57684 VOLUME 6, 2018 where (p 1 , p 2 ) denotes the expected profits of the company under the situation of offering both consumption modes. By taking the first-order derivatives of (p 1 , p 2 ) with respect to p 1 , we obtain
Notice that T > 0, I ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Therefore, 2p 2 
is a monotonically increasing function with regard to p 1 , and the upper limit of p 1 is the optimal solution, i.e.,
By taking the first-order derivatives of (p 1 , p 2 ) with respect to p 2 , we obtain
2 . By setting the Eq. (A15) to zero (i.e.,
= 0) and re-arranging the terms, we obtain
Substitute p * 1 for p 1 , and the optimal solution for the prepaid-based mode is
And the optimal expected profits for the company are
D. COMPARISON
Without loss of generality, we compare the expected profits of the company without transfers under different pricing modes in a monopoly, and the profit comparison of the company without transfers is just a special case.
1) COMPARISON BETWEEN ONLY USE-BASED MODE AND ONLY PREPAID-BASED MODE
Subtract the expected profits of the company using only the prepaid-based mode (A9) from adopting only the use-based one (A4). Thus, we can obtain *
Let
and then, we find:
. It demonstrates that in a monopoly, if customers' psychological costs c are lower than c 0 , the company that chooses use-based pricing will gain more expected profits than the company using the prepaid-based mode. In addition, the company that chooses the prepaid-based mode will gain more expected profits than the company adopting the use-based mode. Particularly, for the companies where transfer is not allowed, c 0 = φ − φ(I +1) T 2(α+1) .
2) COMPARISON BETWEEN ONLY USE-BASED MODE AND COMBINATION OF BOTH MODES
Subtract the expected profit of the company using the combined mode (A18) from adopting only the use-based one (A4), and we can obtain *
It is obviously that * 1 − * ≤ 0 (i.e., * 1 ≤ * ). Hence, the company that chooses the combined mode will always gain more expected profits than the company adopting the use-based mode.
3) COMPARISON BETWEEN ONLY PREPAID-BASED MODE AND COMBINATION OF BOTH MODES
Subtract the expected profits of the company using the combined mode (A18) from using only prepaid-based one (A9), and we can obtain *
Notice that φ − c = p * 1 > 0. Therefore, * 2 − * ≤ 0, i.e., * 2 ≤ * , and the company that chooses the combined mode will always gain more expected profits than the company adopts the prepaid-based mode.
In conclusion, if c < c 0 , then * > * 1 > * 2 and if c ≥ c 0 , then * ≥ * 2 ≥ * 1 . The combination of both pricing modes is higher than using only one of them alone. 
APPENDIX B
The perceived value of customer i who purchases a service products from Company A and Company B are, respectively
And, to satisfy the participation constraint, 0 
By setting ε = lim
e., B4) contradict each other. Similarly, we can prove that the condition (B2) cannot be satisfied when p * A1 > p * B1 . Therefore, there is no Nash equilibrium when p
, we can assume that the market shares for both companies are equal with half of that in a monopoly since the consumers' perceived values for both of them are equal. Then, the expected profits of Company A and Company B are, respectively
By setting ε = lim µ→0 µ, for Company A, we obtain The perceived value of the customer i who purchases service products from Company A and Company B are respectively
Assume that the customers are rational and they will choose the company that makes their perceived value highest. Set k c = To see that this game yields a unique asymmetric Nash equilibrium, it is sufficient to check whether the second-order conditions are satisfied at the Nash equilibrium. Taking the second-order derivatives of A1 , B2 with respect to p A1 , p B2 , respectively, we obtain 
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